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Salloum v. Boyd Gaming Corp., 137 Nev. Adv. Op. 56 (Sep. 23, 2021)1 
 




 The Nevada Supreme Court upheld a lower court’s dismissal of an employment 
discrimination case. Boyd Gaming Corporation (“Boyd”) terminated Salloum’s employment. 
The limitation period for an employment discrimination claim expired 180 days after the alleged 
discriminatory action. In 2019, the legislature amended NRS 613.4302 to extend the limitation 
period, and Salloum subsequently filed a claim. Boyd filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that 
Salloum’s claims expired under the previous version of the statute and the amended statute did 
not apply. The lower court agreed with Boyd and dismissed the claim. The lower court also 
found that equitable tolling did not apply. 
 Because the amendment to NRS 613.4303 did not explicitly state that it applied 
retroactively, the Court held that the district court was correct. The Court found that equitable 
tolling did not apply because Salloum did not establish that his failure to timely file his claim 
resulted from factors he could not control. 
 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
  
 Boyd fired Salloum on August 15, 2018. In February 2019, Salloum sent a letter to the 
EEOC to request that the EEOC investigate alleged discrimination by Boyd against Salloum. In 
June, Salloum filed complaints with the EEOC and the Nevada Equal Rights Commission 
(NERC), alleging Boyd fired him for discriminatory reasons. He requested a right to sue letter on 
August 12, 2019. The letter was issued the next day, and Salloum filed a claim in district court 
on November 1, 2019. Boyd moved for dismissal, arguing that the claims had expired under the 
older version of NRS 613.430,4 which was in effect through September 30, 2019. The older 
version of the statute only allowed 180 days after the alleged discrimination to file a claim. 
Salloum argued that the new version, which established the 180-day period or 90 days after 
issuance of a right-to-sue letter, whichever is later, controlled, so his complaint was timely 
because he filed it within 90 days of receiving a right-to-sue letter. He also argued his claims 
were not barred because of equitable tolling. The district court concluded that the older version 




The 2019 amendment to NRS 613.430 did not revive Salloum’s expired claims 
 
 The Court concluded that the 2019 amendment did not retroactively apply because the 
legislature did not explicitly state that it did so. The Court relied on precedent that legislation 
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does not apply retroactively unless the legislature specifically states that it does so, or that 
retroactive application is necessary to meet the legislature’s intent.5  
 An exception to retroactive application is when amended statutes only relate to remedies 
and procedure and do not affect substantive rights, in which case the amended statutes apply 
retroactively to pending cases.6 The Court concluded that applying the amended statute would 
affect Boyd’s substantive rights because the limitation period had already expired, relieving 
Boyd of potential liability. Therefore, retroactive application of the amended statute was not 
appropriate. 
 The Court previously addressed whether the removal of a limitation period concerning 
child support collection applied retroactively to revive expired claims.7 In that case, the 
legislature removed a portion of the bill that would have provided for retroactive application of 
the amended statute, so the Court concluded that the legislature did not intend for the amendment 
to apply retroactively or to revive expired claims.8 The Court stated that the majority of 
jurisdictions to address the issue of retroactive application of amended statutes have held that 
without a clear expression of intent from the legislature, statutory lengthening of limitation 
periods do not revive previously expired claims. The Court held that this principle applies in 
Nevada. Because there was not explicit intent in the amendment to NRS 613.412, it does not 
apply retroactively. Salloum’s claims expired before the statute was amended, so the lengthened 
period did not revive his claim against Boyd. 
  
Equitable tolling does not apply to Salloum’s claim 
 
 The Court stated that the district court erred in concluding that equitable tolling could 
never apply to employment discrimination claims. This was harmless error, because Salloum 
could not demonstrate that equitable tolling was warranted. To establish the need for equitable 
tolling, a plaintiff must show that they could not timely file claims due to circumstances beyond 
their control.9 Salloum could not do so. The record showed that he had all the knowledge he 
needed to file a claim at the time he sent the letter to the EEOC in February 2019. Additionally, 
Salloum argued that equitable tolling should apply because of a “miscalculation” of the statute. 




 The Court held that when a legislature lengthens a limitation period after the expiration of 
a claim, the lengthened limitation period does not apply retroactively and does not revive a claim 
unless the legislature states that it applies retroactively and revives claims. Because the 
legislature did not make such a statement here, the lengthened limitation period did not apply to 
Salloum’s claims. He also was not entitled to equitable tolling. Therefore, the district court’s 
dismissal was appropriate. 
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